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TRANSCRIPT
PANEL
A JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
CORNELL LAW SCHOOL SYMPOSIUM
FEBRUARY 10, 2015
Judge Marsha S. Berzon, Justice Christine M. Durham
& Judge Lee H. Rosenthal †
JUDGE LEE ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much.  It’s a real pleasure
to be here and to congratulate those who labored on the Restatement
of Employment Law.  It is the culmination of fourteen years of hard
work and of a process that itself is worth thinking about and
celebrating.
It’s also a pleasure to meet with the law students tasked with put-
ting together this symposium and the Cornell Law Review issue dedi-
cated to assessing the Restatement.  This afternoon, we want to talk
about our views of the process and the product.  We ask that you join
in that conversation.  Please do not hold your questions until the end.
We recognize that your being here at a quarter to four on a Friday,
close to exams, is really remarkable in itself, and we very much appre-
ciate that.
Let me begin by going back to the topic that’s been an undercur-
rent throughout the day and that we talked about briefly this
morning.
The topic is really a series of questions.  What is a Restatement?
Why does it have the position it occupies in American law?  To what
extent are we constrained by that format?  Or are we empowered with
greater influence by that format?  What are the benefits?  What are
the drawbacks?  How did we decide on the Restatement model as
† Marsha S. Berzon has been a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit since 2000 and served as an Advisor on the ALI Restatement of Employment
Law.  Christine M. Durham is a justice of the Utah Supreme Court, served as an Advisor to
the ALI Restatement of Employment Law project, and is an ALI Council Member.  Lee H.
Rosenthal has been a United States District Judge in the Southern District of Texas since
1992, served as an Advisor on the ALI Restatement of Employment Law, and is an ALI
Council Member.
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opposed to a different approach for the topic of employment law in
the first place?
First, what are the different approaches?  What’s the continuum
on which we’re operating?
Restatements are the most traditional work of the ALI.  They are
defined by the black-letter law that begins each section.  When Profes-
sor Estreicher talks about “protecting the brand,” I think that’s really
what the brand coalesces around.  What a Restatement at its core pro-
vides is a statement of black-letter law.  Think about how hallowed that
phrase—“black-letter law”—has become.
Then there are the comments that provide explanation and the
reporters’ notes.  The comments, of course, are what ought to be the
law student’s best friend.  They contain the Illustrations that make
clear how different facts and assumptions can generate different out-
comes.  They’re terrific for understanding and for teaching.  The
package anchors and amplifies the black-letter law.
The focus on black-letter law suggests that all we are talking about
is a statement—or a Restatement—of what the law is.  But it is not so
simple.
At the other end of the spectrum, or maybe somewhere in the
middle, is what we have begun to do more of at the ALI: documents
called “Principles of Law” as contrasted with “Restatements of Law.”
How are they different?
The boiled-down, oversimplified, unnuanced description is that a
Restatement is a statement of what the law is, while a Principles Pro-
ject is about what the law could or should be.  A Principles Project is
less tethered to existing cases or other common authoritative sources
of the law.
Actually, the continuum goes even further out than that because,
from time to time, the ALI, much like the cow, ruminates.  When ru-
minations are going on we might produce something like a white pa-
per.  These are thoughtful discussions on a subject that is difficult,
timely, and could benefit from the kind of perspective that we think
the ALI offers.  That perspective combines different voices from dif-
ferent parts of the legal profession critiquing the work of thoughtful
reporters, scholars who devote time, expertise, and a passion for im-
proving the law in the area at hand.
That process is similar in some ways, but very different in other
ways, from that of a scholar writing by him or herself, perhaps with the
benefit of some criticisms or helpful suggestions from colleagues but
without the rigorous repeated back and forth that the ALI subjects its
work to.  The ALI provides a peer review process unlike others, and
that provides a distinctive benefit.
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So those are the three basic things.  Restatements, Principles
Projects, and what I’ll call ruminations.
I would submit, however, that the stark distinction between what
the law is, on the one hand, and what the law ought to be or could be,
on the other—Restatement versus Principles—doesn’t do either one
of them justice at all.  And in the context of employment law, the dis-
tinction doesn’t even come close to capturing what either alternative
could be or is.
We are coming up on the 100th anniversary of the ALI.  For a
century, it has been the leading independent organization in the
United States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and oth-
erwise improve the law.  If all we’re doing is saying what the law is,
we’re not clarifying, we’re not modernizing, and we certainly aren’t
improving.
What does it mean to say “what the law is” when we are dealing
with not only federal courts but fifty state jurisdictions, each of which
often may produce conflicting law in the same subject area on virtu-
ally any day you can name?  Nowhere is that more true than in em-
ployment law.
The law is not so simple that we can say with confidence what it is
at any given point in time.  To those who fear that the production of a
Restatement “freezes” the law, our answer is that we’re just not that
good or that powerful.  We have not frozen the law in any field in
which a Restatement has been written that I can think of, and that’s
not the goal.
Justice is done to neither Restatements nor Principles Projects by
an oversimplified description.
One way to think about the difference between Restatements and
Principles is by asking, “Who is the intended audience?”
The main intended audience for a Restatement tends to be
judges, common-law judges like us.  By contrast, a Principles Project
has a broader audience that can include legislative drafters, adminis-
trative agencies, or those in charge of writing regulations.  They can
be private actors.
A Principles Project, for example, on corporate governance is
largely directed at private actors.
JUSTICE CHRISTINE DURHAM: And they can also be judges.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: Exactly.  They are not mutually exclusive but
it’s the main target audience that is a bit different between a Restate-
ment and a Principles Project.
A Restatement, in a way, goes through a process that is very much
like what a common-law judge does, a really good common-law judge
who never sleeps, and who has boundless energy and endless re-
sources.  Indeed, a Restatement can tap into the combined brains of
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all the advisors, all the members’ consultative group participants, the
ALI Council, every member of the Institute at the annual meetings,
and all who are part of the give-and-take that occurs throughout the
process.
So a Restatement starts with the steps we judges use when we get a
new case.  We look at what most people who have dealt with this issue
and with these kinds of facts have done.  What’s the majority rule?
What’s the way in which most courts deal with it?
JUDGE MARSHA BERZON: Can I interject . . . the first problem,
though, is defining the project.  It’s important to look at how this pro-
ject was defined and changed along the way as well.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: Absolutely.  That’s an ongoing, evolutionary,
dynamic process.
Once you frame the problem or project and figure out how most
people—judges—have approached it, you have to figure out if there is
a trend that is different, and if so, how prevalent?  Where does it oc-
cur?  What drives it?
Then you’ve got to figure out, perhaps, if there is a clear trend, in
one way or another, different from what’s been the majority rule,
which is better.  And then you have to figure out why it is better.
Which approach will lead to better coherence in the law?  Is there
a way to ascertain, within the competence of this imagined
common-law judge, if this is an area in which a single rule may not, in
fact, be the best?
There are lots of different things that a Restatement does that
mimic or mirror what a great common-law judge does.
A Principles Project does something different.  It is less trying to
identify where we are and more emphasizing where we could be.  It is
less tethered to what the current cases say, to what virtually every juris-
diction does.  That was a strong feature of the current Restatement.
But that doesn’t mean that a Restatement is limited to the major-
ity rule.  Courts can deviate and often do.
One of the great challenges for a Restatement is how to deal with
fields like employment that are a mix of common law and statutes.
Employment is an area in which there are statutes that confer signifi-
cant discretion on judges, filled in by common law, but that also have
significant, detailed regulatory structures that define the legal stan-
dards and principles that apply.
Restatements began in fields that were dominated by common
law.  But as more and more areas of American law become a mix of
statutes as well as common-law decisions, much of what a Restatement
ends up wanting to do is a combination of, “Here’s how we think that
common law should best be defined, where we are now,” and propos-
als for revising legislation, which is more akin to a Principles Project.
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The ALI is working on how best to accomplish this kind of
blended approach when the field demands it, without diluting the
ability to generate black-letter law aimed primarily—though not
only—toward judges.
In employment law, the reporters faced the complexities of fifty
different state jurisdictions and federal statutes and common law.  Em-
ployment law spans a huge range of fields, as was made clear in our
last panel.1  Employment law includes actors ranging from the most
sophisticated people in the executive suite down to the kind of work-
ers who we often see, whose focus is on their hourly rates, what over-
time they didn’t get paid, if they will still have a job next year, who are
working in low-level jobs and who have little to no bargaining power,
no leverage, no autonomy.
How does this Employment Restatement accommodate the juris-
dictional variations, the different kinds of employment relationships,
the different kinds of employees, and the mix of common-law and
statutory approaches to all of those problems?
That was the small problem that Sam and his colleagues faced,
with the added complication that, as Sam pointed out, this is a field
divided at the “v.”  It is very difficult to mediate the fundamental dif-
ferences between those who habitually represent or advocate for the
interests of plaintiffs, otherwise known as employees in most cases,
and those who habitually represent or advocate for the interests of
employers.  The divide is deep and difficult to bridge.
We’re going to talk more about the challenges of employment
law in particular, and then talk a little bit more about the ways in
which the Restatement met those challenges that are particularly use-
ful for judges.  Here I want to credit the Law Review for having the
brilliance to bring before you a perfect range of perspectives on that
subject.
We have a federal appellate court judge who deals with the range
of cases the very large Ninth Circuit generates.  We have a federal trial
judge who has been on the bench for a very long time.  And we have a
distinguished state supreme court justice who deals with primarily
state-law issues, of course, but who in that context sees the relation-
ship between state and federal law.
We’ve all three seen how this field of law has evolved.  When each
of us took in law school what now is employment law, it was then
called labor law and we were mostly worried about unions.  The world
has changed.  We are in a good position to comment to you on how
the ALI’s Restatement of Employment Law contributes to the field,
1 See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the Workplace,
100 CORNELL L. REV 1255 (2015); Michael Selmi, Trending and the Restatement of Employment
Law’s Provisions on Employee Mobility, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1369 (2015).
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can influence what we do as judges, and we hope can support your
work as well.
JUDGE BERZON: I want to talk briefly about one way in which the
Employment Restatement differs from most others.  That difference is
the result of the fact that employment law is a statute-permeated area.
True, the enactment of a wide range of employment statutes is a
relatively recent development as law goes—meaning the last fifty years
or so.  Still, it seems to me no accident that it didn’t occur to the ALI
to have a separate Restatement of Employment Law until this set of
statutory protections for employees proliferated, beginning a bit in
the 1930s but primarily starting in the 1960s.  The statutes in the field
now cover wage and hours; racial, religious, age, sex, and disability
discrimination; occupational safety and health; whistleblower protec-
tion; and many other matters.  Much of what we now think of as the
common law of employment, unlike the usual sequence of
common-law and statutory development, is really a mimicking of the
statutory protections rather than the other way around.
For example, the creation of the tort of discharge against public
policy, as well as the expansion of employee contract law to include
contracts grounded in employee handbooks and implicit good faith
and fair dealing provisions, came after the enactment of employment
discrimination statutes, and reflected concepts of fairness within the
employment relations first recognized in those statutes.  These recent
developments in the common law of employment relations came
about because the statutory protections were so interstitial.  The ques-
tion arose, once those relatively narrow protections were in place—
why isn’t everybody else protected, too?  Some common-law judges—
preeminent among them my colleague and coteacher Joseph Grodin,
in California, then a California appellate and Supreme Court justice—
started developing, through the common-law process and drawing on
tort law and contract law and other common-law sources, a broader
set of protections for employees generally.
Given this close connection between the statutes and the com-
mon law governing the employment relationship, I was uncomfortable
from the beginning, and to some degree remain uncomfortable, with
modeling the Restatement of Employment Law on the usual, histori-
cal system of common-law Restatements, which do not directly take
into account statutory developments and interpretations.  The task is
seen, and was seen in this instance, as compiling and synthesizing law
in common-law areas.  As a result, with regard to employment law, the
Restatement covers some things and not others, even though they are
right up against each other as a practical matter.
The next conversation we’re going to have is about how we in our
different kinds of courts do deal with common-law employment
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-6\CRN608.txt unknown Seq: 7 24-SEP-15 14:23
2015] A JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT 1459
concepts and therefore will be aided by the Restatement.  But as you
will see when I get to that subject, as a federal judge, I’m mainly deal-
ing with statutes, although the statutes incorporate and refer to
common-law concepts in various ways.  We do hear state diversity
cases, of course, and so do decide state common-law issues.  But in
those cases, we are fairly shy about inventing new legal principles that
have not been adopted by the relevant state’s courts.
Except as to state diversity cases, the common-law concepts come
to us in employment cases indirectly rather than directly, as we con-
sider whatever statutory problem we are addressing.  Yet, the same is-
sues do recur from statute to statute, and our interpretations—to a
large degree, although not uniformly—draw on those reached with
regard to similar questions under other statutes, as well as in
common-law contexts.  As a result, I question whether there isn’t
enough uniformity of problems among the various statutes that one
couldn’t have essentially developed a common law of federal employ-
ment statutes, as part of the Employment Law Restatement project.
Of course, the various statutes have different histories, purposes, and
wording—but still, there is a tendency for judges to transfer concepts
from one to the other.  I wonder whether that phenomenon
shouldn’t have been recognized more than it was in developing the
Restatement.
JUSTICE DURHAM: What an interesting idea, a common law of fed-
eral employment statutes.
JUDGE BERZON: Not just federal employment statutes.  State and
federal statutes because state statutes tend to be similar to—or if not
consciously different from—federal statutes covering the same
matters.
JUSTICE DURHAM: But not exactly.  A couple of things I forgot to
ask my introducer to mention are that I did serve as an advisor on this
project, and also as a member of the ALI Council that sent the draft to
the membership of the ALI.  I prepared to frame some of my remarks
today in the context of Chapter Five of the Restatement, having to do
with wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
Because although I don’t disagree with what Judge Rosenthal has
said about the importance of statutes, there are portions of the Re-
statement, and Chapter Five is significantly one of them, where al-
though we deal on a frequent basis with the interstices left between
statutory regulations, state and federal, it’s also an arena in which the
purest kind of common-law development is still going on.
The other reason I’m interested in it is that twenty-five years ago I
wrote the opinion in my state which adopted the common-law tort of
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wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.2  It’s kind of nice to
have seen it come full circle twenty-five years later, and to see what’s
happened in the interim.
When I was interviewed for my position on my court many, many
years ago by the nominating commission, one of the lawyers on the
commission said, “So tell me what you think about judges making
law.”  Well, I’m sitting there looking at a nominating commission, and
I say, “Oh no, judges don’t make law.”
I’ve now been a judge for a very long time, and I’m perfectly com-
fortable, especially just having won another retention election, to tell
you that state judges in particular are lawmakers, and in the context of
the common law, we shape, on the basis of numerous principles.
Now, we try to do that on a principled basis.  But that is the function
of the common law.  It is judge-made law.
The benefits of a project like the ALI’s Restatements, and this
Restatement in particular, are numerous in that undertaking, and
they’ve been mentioned by many here today—the doctrinal organiza-
tion, the identification of issues, the bringing of order to the process,
and the identification particularly of areas which are open and evolv-
ing.  I was one of the ones that tried to get Sam to jettison employ-
ment at-will at the beginning, and failed at that project, along with
others.
PROFESSOR SAMUEL ESTREICHER: I wish I had such power.
JUSTICE DURHAM: The point that I want to make about that is that
I do not agree with many of the critics of the Restatement who claim
that it is freezing employment law in a bad place because some of the
underlying common-law doctrines have a vast history behind them,
starting with the concept of at-will employment.  In fact, it’s my im-
pression that any freezing phenomenon, that any slowness in the di-
rection of the development of the law in this arena, has been arguably
due more to the caution of state-court judges in moving into new are-
nas and in being more creative about their thinking.
Restatements are more descriptive than prescriptive.  They’re in-
tended, I think at least as I use them, to be a collection of the judicial
thinking on a subject in the United States, which as Judge Rosenthal
suggested, is where the common-law judge starts.  They are black let-
ter.  They’ve become the classic definition of black letter.
But when I look at the black letter of the Restatement, that’s the
beginning of my engagement with the subject matter and the begin-
ning of my inquiry.  Common-law judges have the option of citing or
not citing any Restatement.  I can’t tell you how many times even I, a
longtime member of the ALI, can get all the way through a case, and
2 Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992).
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sometimes finish with a case, before it occurs to me, “Nobody men-
tioned any Restatements,” or, “I wonder if there are any in this area.”
Lots of lawyers don’t know about them, and lots of lawyers don’t
rely on them.  It is true that judges are a primary audience, but some-
times we are conduits, and we need others to do the research to help
us get where we need to go.  The lawyers have a key role to become
aware that Restatements exist, to study their contents, and to bring
them to us, so we can adopt them or not adopt them in the most
sensible ways.
The judicial literature is littered with opinions in which judges
have said, “We know what the Restatement says; we don’t agree with it.
That’s not a principle that is consistent with our precedent in our
jurisdiction.”  All the lawyers who practice in our court tend to start
with our precedent.  That’s the trouble with our federalist system;
you’ve got fifty sets of precedent in the common-law arena.
Even if we decide to adopt a Restatement, we may adopt it in full
or in part.  My own court has struggled in various arenas with the con-
tents of a Restatement rule and come to the conclusion that the ratio-
nale underlying some part of it is not where we want to go with the law
in our jurisdiction, and so we don’t adopt the whole thing.
I think it’s important to assess this new Restatement at the outset,
before anybody has really used it.  It will be so interesting to come
back in ten years and assess the impact it has had.  But it’s important
to recall, as we’re in this process of trying to decide its likely impact,
that there’s judicial restraint and all kinds of other reasons for caution
affecting judges.  Common-law judges are, as a rule, extraordinarily
cautious, and in the employment law arena, they have sometimes been
perhaps more cautious than they need to be.
I wanted to say one more thing, and that has to do with history.
Some history has been discussed today; but one of the things that I
wanted to point out is that there was a point in time in the nineteenth
century and the early twentieth century when you had the develop-
ment of a partnership between common-law traditionalism and lais-
sez-faire constitutionalism in the state and federal courts.  You had,
first, a very slow and incremental elaboration on a traditional com-
mon-law system, and this is particularly true in the employment law
area.
How old is the concept of at-will employment?  Do any of my
scholars know?
PROFESSOR STEWART SCHWAB: Many would date it to Horace Gay
Wood’s treatise of 1877.3
3 H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877).
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JUSTICE DURHAM: Then you also had laissez-faire constitutional-
ism going on in the state courts around their state constitutions, and
in the federal courts around the federal Constitution.  Reformers
actually saw the common law as a barrier to necessary economic and
social reforms, particularly in the employment area.  Cooley, in his
treatise on state constitutional law in 1868, pointed out that the com-
mon law’s sacred right to property antedated even the adoption of
state constitutions, and the federal implementation, and so limited
the power of legislators to enact remedial legislation.4
In 1913, another state-law scholar, William Dodd, pointed out
that, “[T]he greater number of our state courts are illiberal and,
under our present constitutional and judicial organization, are able to
block needed social and industrial legislation.”5  Again, much of it was
directed to the workplace.  We had this whole revolution that subse-
quently went on in a very interesting form, which few people know
much about, and that’s the revolution occurring in and through state
constitutional amendments.
We know all these labor law reforms are being incorporated into
state constitutions in an effort to force judges to develop common-law
principles that would be more progressive in their interpretation.
One of the things I’m very interested in, particularly in the arena of
wrongful termination in violation of public policy, is the degree to
which state constitutional affirmative rights, and state constitutional
language, have implications as material for state common-law judges,
and arguably federal common-law judges, in interpreting their statu-
tory schemes and in moving their common-law principles forward.
Not to constitutionalize the common law.  That’s not the purpose.
But to see that history, and that evolution, as part of our interpretive
base.
JUDGE BERZON: I am now going to get a little more specific as to
the ways in which, in my judicial work as a federal appellate judge,
employment common-law issues arise and how we handle them.  But I
want to begin by reporting that I may be the first federal appellate
judge who has cited the Restatement of Employment Law—actually,
the final draft of the Restatement—in a published decision.6
JUSTICE DURHAM: Did you call it the Restatement Third?
JUDGE BERZON: I called it the Restatement, parenthesis Third, cit-
ing the draft.  The opinion was issued on November 7th.  I’ve been
having a discussion with Stewart Schwab about whether it needs to be
revised in light of the actions of the ALI plenary body in May 2014
4 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).
5 W. F. Dodd, Social Legislation and the Courts, 28 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 5 (1913).
6 See Tamosaitis v. URS, Inc., 771 F.3d 539, 556 n.9 (9th Cir. 2014).
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adopting the draft and the change in the ALI system of numbering
Restatements.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: Can I say just one word about the numbering
issue?  Sixty years ago, the decision was made within the American
Law Institute, that every Restatement project within a series would be
given the number of that series.  When the second series was started,
every Restatement within that series was the Restatement Second of X.
That kept going for sixty years.  The result was that when this
Restatement was in progress over eleven years, as a matter of sixty
years’ habit we called it the Restatement Third of Employment Law,
even though there was no Restatement First or Second of Employ-
ment Law.
This was the project that made us stop and think, “You know
what, this is really dumb.”
For a group of people dominated by academics, great lawyers,
and terrific judges, the one thing we are sensitive about is looking
stupid.  We don’t mind controversy.
So, in a refreshing and, for us, quite revolutionary act, we decided
to forget this going forward.  We’re not going to go back and renum-
ber things, but going forward, if this is the first work in a particular
subject area, it is called “The Restatement,” here, of Employment.
PROFESSOR ESTREICHER: Judge Berzon, what is the name of the
case you referred to?
JUDGE BERZON: The name of the case is Tamosaitis v. URS, Inc.7  I
think the case as a whole is instructive as to the ways in which
common-law and statutory concepts cross in employment law.
Tamosaitis concerned an esoteric statute—the Energy Reorganiza-
tion Act, which includes a whistleblower section.8  To decide the case,
we needed to construe the whistleblower section.  As it turned out, the
issues we addressed under the ERA whistleblower protection provision
arise in a variety of employment law contexts.9
In brief, the Department of Energy hired Bechtel, which hired a
group called URS Corp., which hired Mr. Tamosaitis to run a cleanup
project at the former Hanford Nuclear Project in Washington.  Mr.
Tamosaitis was in charge of aspects of the cleanup project, but he was
working under these various entities.  URS Corp. and Bechtel were
supposed to clear the cleanup project by a certain date.  Mr.
Tamosaitis concluded that the cleanup wasn’t done, and he objected
to stating that it was.  He didn’t get fired, but, according to his evi-
dence on summary judgment, the Department of Energy and Bechtel
told URS to get rid of him, and he was in fact terminated from
7 Id.
8 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (2012).
9 See Tamosaitis, 771 F.3d. at 551.
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Hanford and initially given a job in a basement somewhere.  He was
then later offered jobs in various places that he didn’t want to be,
although URS did not fire him.  So one of the issues was whether the
antiretaliation provisions of the whistleblower sections protect again
retaliatory nondischarge, so to speak—that is, adverse treatment by an
employer short of discharge.  The parallel question, it turns out, the
one whose resolution kept changing, probably more than any other,
during the development of the Restatement, in the context of retalia-
tory treatment against public policy.  After the plenary session last
May, the conclusion was that the ALI is not taking a position as to
whether nondischarge discipline can be the basis for a public policy
discharge common-law cause of action.
PROFESSOR SCHWAB: The action you’re describing is very close to
constructive discharge.
JUDGE BERZON: We did not need to reach whether there was con-
structive discharge because in the context of this statute, there was
little doubt that the retaliation was sufficient by itself.  As I shall ex-
plain shortly, the question of the common-law status of retaliatory
nondischarge, as I am calling it, was debatable in the Tamosaitis case
for quite a different reason.
PROFESSOR DEBORAH DEMOTT: My view would be that I’m just as
glad the Restatement is not taking a position on that.  I’m afraid they
might take the wrong position.
JUDGE BERZON: Well, right. I understand that.
So here is what we said in what I do think is the first appellate
decision citing the Restatement: “Although the majority of state courts
do not recognize adverse employment claims falling short of actual or
constructive discharge,” we said, and then quoted from and cited the
Restatement: then “two state supreme courts have explicitly sustained
‘wrongful demotion’ claims, and a few intermediate appellate courts
have either sustained claims of this type or indicated their approval of
such claims.”  We went on: “Those courts that do allow such claims
emphasize that they are analogous to wrongful discharge claims,” cit-
ing a California case and a Nebraska case.10
Now, what’s interesting is, how did this question come into the
Tamosaitis case?  It was not because we needed to decide whether the
statute applied to what happened to the plaintiff because that was
clear in the statute.  Instead, the matter arose because there was a dis-
crete issue in the case aside from interpreting the statute—namely,
whether the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial on his retaliatory
whistleblower claim in federal court.  This question was complicated
by the fact that there is an agency-exhaustion requirement in the
10 Id. at 556 n.9.
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statute, and, if the agency had gotten around to deciding this case
within the prescribed statutory period, Tamosaitis wouldn’t have got-
ten a jury trial.11  But our conclusion was that once he was able to opt
out of the administrative procedure and file a judicial case because
the agency hadn’t decided in time, he could get a jury trial.12
To come to that conclusion, we had to decide—because the Sev-
enth Amendment jurisprudence so requires—whether the ERA’s
whistleblower remedy was a tort-like common-law legal right, as op-
posed to an equitable or statutory or regulatory, non-tort-like right.
That distinction explains why we needed to determine whether
nondischarge discipline sufficiently partook of the characteristics of a
common-law tort that is analogous to a tort-like common-law legal
remedy.
This Seventh Amendment problem is illustrative of one of many
ways in which federal appellate judges come across employment com-
mon-law problems.  Another obvious example of such instances is di-
versity cases.  But, as I said earlier, we tend to be shy about developing
novel legal principles in diversity cases.
One interesting example of federal common-law employment is-
sues arising in federal court cases is that in the last three or four
months, there have been three different cases about FedEx drivers
and whether they’re employees or independent contractors.  There
was also one case in the D.C. Circuit somewhat earlier.13  The D.C.
Circuit case was under the National Labor Relations Act, as was one
before the National Labor Relations Board that was decided in
October.
There were also two cases in the Ninth Circuit, one arising under
California state law14 and one under Oregon state law.15  And there
was one in the Seventh Circuit, which certified the issue to the state
supreme court, saying “[w]e’re not doing this.  We don’t know the
answer under state law.”16
Certification to a state supreme court is a common method for
my court as well when we have an important issue of state law.  How-
ever, my colleagues—I was not involved in the two FedEx cases—did
not do that.  They were of the view that the California standards for
who is an employee and who is an independent contractor were not at
issue, as state law is clear as to the applicable standards.  Instead, the
FedEx cases, the two Ninth Circuit cases held, concerned the
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(4) (2012).
12 Tamosaitis, 771 F.3d at 559.
13 FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
14 Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014).
15 Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2014).
16 Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 686 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 2012).
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application of established state law, so there was nothing to certify.
California law, the Ninth Circuit held, is based on a fairly traditional
right-to-control standard, with not a lot of the entrepreneurial factors
included.17  The Restatement of Employment Law adopts a similar
standard.
Diversity cases, then, are the most direct instances in which fed-
eral appellate courts get into the issues covered by the Restatement of
Employment Law.  But there are others as well.  First of all, there’s the
principle that Michael Harper alluded to earlier, sometimes honored
in the breach, that if a federal statute uses a term with a common-law
history, the presumption is that Congress used it in that common-law
sense.  But there are various exceptions to and deviations from that
principle.
One example that came to mind, in another employment case in
which I was on the panel, now pending on rehearing, was an ERISA
case, Gabriel v. Alaska Electrical Pension Fund.18  The question was,
“What kind of equitable remedies are available in ERISA cases after
Cigna Corp. v. Amara,19 where the Supreme Court opened up the
range of equitable remedies?”  I wrote the dissent to the original opin-
ion.  The majority took the reference to the remedy of surcharge in
the Amara opinion, which cited the Restatement of Trusts, as referring
to the particular circumstances in which the surcharge rules apply.20
I said in dissent that the facts of Amara and the Supreme Court’s
use of the term “surcharge-like” did not meet the requirements for
the most traditional uses of surcharge.21  I was arguing that the Amara
holding was at a higher level of generality than the traditional com-
mon law, and so than the Restatement of Trusts.  [The original panel
opinion has now been superseded by a unanimous opinion that no
longer maintains that the details of the common law of surcharge nec-
essarily apply under ERISA.22]  Certainly, sometimes the Supreme
Court—Amara is an example—uses common-law concepts as reflected
in the Restatements in interpreting federal statutes, but then draws
out its own version of those concepts for the particular statute that it’s
working with.
Then there’s the phenomenon that I was calling earlier “the fed-
eral statutory common law,”—that is, issues that in general, and in
employment law in particular, recur over statutes.  In Tamosaitis, for
example, several such questions arose.
17 See Alexander, 765 F.3d at 988–89.
18 755 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 773 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2014).
19 563 U.S. 421 (2011).
20 Gabriel, 755 F.3d at 658–59.
21 Id. at 667 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
22 Gabriel, 773 F.3d at 962–66.
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One such question in Tamosaitis was a joint employer-like issue.
Another arose because URS, the employer-contractor, had a
customer, Bechtel, telling URS to get rid of Tamosaitis.  URS’s argu-
ment was, “Well, we had no choice.  We didn’t have a retaliatory mo-
tive.  We were just doing what we had to do under our contract with
Bechtel.”23  The argument is not dissimilar, as we say in the opinion,
from a Title VII case in which a customer says, “I don’t want any black
people serving me.”
In Title VII cases, that doesn’t work, and we said in this opinion
that it doesn’t work in the ERA whistleblower context either.  Al-
though we did mention the Title VII cases, we also relied on the par-
ticular language of this particular statute.24  I understand the tension
between those two approaches—that is, there is commonality among
the statutes, but there are also differences, so that it’s difficult to en-
compass what I would call statutory common law in a Restatement.  As
a result, there are whole chunks of issues that come up recurrently in
interpreting employment statutes that are not covered in the Restate-
ment, including the one I just mentioned.
Overall, I tend to use a Restatement in the common-law areas
with which I’m least familiar, like trust law.  These are areas that are
somewhat buried in the past, haven’t changed a lot, and aren’t going
to change much in the future.  For me, the Restatements are very use-
ful as compendia in those areas.  They are useful to get a bearing, to
begin to know what the common-law concepts are.  But we need to be
very cognizant of the fact that it is our job as judges not just to buy
them whole, and therefore not to freeze the development of the law.
This is particularly so in the more usual ways that federal courts en-
counter common-law concepts—that is, embedded in other doctrines,
rather than directly, as I hope I have illustrated.
JUSTICE DURHAM: I kind of want to change the subject, though
not exactly.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: Do you want to talk about the state-court
perspective?
JUSTICE DURHAM: I actually want to elaborate on a theme Judge
Berzon just mentioned of how Restatements generally are used, and
how this one in particular should be used.  I mentioned that I’ve been
thinking about this event today through the prism of the tort for
wrongful discharge.  It is an example of what I said earlier about the
real caution and timidity that a lot of common-law judges express,
and, of course, Judge Berzon just described it on the federal side
where it has, perhaps, more justification.  Comment d for section 5.03
23 See Tamosaitis v. URS Inc., 771 F.3d 539, 551 (9th Cir. 2014).
24 See id. at 553.
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in Chapter Five talks about the fact that one of the available sources
for determining public policy in the arena of public-policy discharge
claims is decisional laws from other jurisdictions.
The comment says it may be persuasive evidence of a well-estab-
lished principle of public policy.  It then goes on to observe, quite
accurately, that some courts are reluctant to predicate a tort action
entirely on judge-made law, although they will predicate it on a legisla-
tive assertion.  They will predicate it on an administrative rule and in
some jurisdictions even a local ordinance or statute.
It struck me as particularly odd when you realize that the tort of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is a judicial creation.
Why should it be difficult in answering the question of “whence
cometh the public policy” for a common-law judge to look to what’s
going on in the common law in other jurisdictions as a potential
source?  That’s just illustrative of the problem I was describing earlier.
I also wanted to quickly mention, looking back on today’s discus-
sions, in terms of the legitimacy—within indeterminacy—that state
judges have in dealing with common law, particularly in an arena like
public policy and wrongful discharge.
When we were talking about autonomy earlier today, we heard
Sam Estreicher talk about background assumptions.  When we were
talking about reasonableness, it came up several different times.  The
whole issue of the indeterminacy of reasonableness as a concept of the
law was discussed when we were talking about the question of what to
do about employer notices in the privacy area.25  It was pointed out
that courts are on their own here because the Restatement doesn’t
give them much guidance.
Then, of course, in the public-policy sources, you’ve got this issue
of decisional law from other states.  The issue that I’m interested in
having to do with state constitutional language, I happen to have
under advisement right now, so I can’t talk very much about it other
than to say it has to do with whether the right to self-defense is suffi-
ciently well established as a matter of public policy that discharge for
exercising self-defense in the employment context should be a basis
for a wrongful-discharge claim.
There are, I think, three relevant decisions.  I’m very grateful that
the Restatement reporters found them all for me.  I can go and read
them myself, and I can think about them.  I can compare them with
what else is going in this section, this chapter, and the comments.  I
find that very helpful.
25 See Charles A. Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1391
(2015); Steven Willborn, Notice, Consent, and Nonconsent: Employee Privacy in the Restatement,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 1423 (2015).
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PROFESSOR ROBERT HILLMAN: Question.  To what extent do you
wait for the lawyers to furnish Restatement provisions through their
briefs?  It sounds, from what I heard in the discussion so far, that
you’re all doing a lot of research on your own.
JUDGE BERZON: Just talking generally?
PROFESSOR HILLMAN: Just in general.
JUDGE BERZON: In general?  We do our own research.  We have to.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: First, we do our own reading.  That is, we
don’t rely on how the lawyers characterize the cases that they cite.
Then we don’t limit ourselves to the cases that they cite.  There is a
reason for both.
JUDGE BERZON: There are many, many examples of why we cannot
be bound by what the lawyers tell us.  But one of my favorite examples,
and one that has something to do with this area, is a Federal Arbitra-
tion Act case I had once.  There was one common ground among the
district court and the parties: all said that the Federal Arbitration Act
didn’t apply to our case because the arbitration agreement was en-
tered into only after the dispute arose.  Of course, the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act says exactly the opposite—arbitration agreements are
enforceable whether entered into before a dispute arises or after it
does.  When the lawyers stood up to argue the case, one of the judges
said, “Where are you getting that from?”—that is, that the Federal Ar-
bitration Act did not apply because the arbitration agreement was
post-dispute.
They say “Oh, a Ninth Circuit case.”
We say, “No, there is no Ninth Circuit case.  But there is a district
court case.”
“Well, it’s from the district court.”
“But the district court is wrong.  Have you read the statute?”  The
answer was, no, they hadn’t.  That’s why we don’t rely on the lawyers.
PROFESSOR SCHWAB: But just to follow up because the point’s so
interesting.  At the extreme, the question is what can you take judicial
notice of or do in your background research.  It’s fine to go read all
your own cases because that’s clearly acceptable; we’d be shocked if
you wouldn’t be doing that.  Checking up, second guessing the law-
yers, not believing on face value the briefs, we all hope you’re doing
that, too.
But I guess I would put it, to what extent do you feel comfortable
in looking at a Restatement on your own before you look at other
things?
JUDGE BERZON: I have no problem at all.
JUSTICE DURHAM: Absolutely.
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JUDGE BERZON: No problem at all.  It’s a place to start research,
just like you’d go to Am. Jur. [American Jurisprudence] in the old days.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: Yes, exactly.  Or C.J.S. [Corpus Juris Secundum.]
PROFESSOR ESTREICHER: Are there particular aspects of what’s
been done here that you find especially helpful?  I’m thinking, for
example, what Professor Harper, who, by the way, is my coauthor of
our labor law book.  I just want you to know that I’ve shown some
flexibility over the course of my career.  The first casebook was by
Harper and Estreicher, although the second was Estreicher and
Harper.  Or vice versa.
You have many federal statutes and state statutes that are based
on employee status and cover employees only.  Michael Harper
looked at the definition of the word “employee”— “person employed
by an employer.”  It’s obviously not a very complete definition.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: Or very helpful.
JUSTICE DURHAM: Or rounded out.
PROFESSOR ESTREICHER: We have the Supreme Court saying in Na-
tionwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,26 that the definition of em-
ployee is based on the common law.  We went to the Restatement
(Second) of Agency; we didn’t have Deborah DeMott’s current vol-
ume available.  In the Restatement of Agency definition, the first part
is about “right of control.”27  The second part has nine other factors,
and two parts don’t really connect up.  What Michael Harper has
done is taken those nine other factors and made it part of the black
letter, as it were.
In most cases, right of control will spell employee status.  Those
are the easy cases.  But there are hard cases involving very skilled em-
ployees whom the employer controls because the discipline controls
the work.  We’re talking about mobile workers who are judged on how
many miles they travel and how long it takes them.  That’s an alterna-
tive ground for employee status.  Michael made a heroic effort in
Chapter One to unpack all that and lay it out.  What do you think of
how helpful it is?
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: I can take a stab at that, Sam.  It’s a great ques-
tion.  I agree with you that that’s a wonderful example, particularly
from the perspective of the beleaguered trial judge.  I am trying to
rule on the motions and get or keep the cases moving.  And I’m in
trial.  There’s a lot going on in any given day.  The pace is a little bit
different from what some of the appellate courts enjoy.  A huge recur-
ring issue is whether a particular individual is an employee or an inde-
pendent contractor.  It can come up in a lot of different ways.
26 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
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It comes up under the Fair Labor Standards Act because only em-
ployees are covered by it.  It comes up in lots of different statutory and
common-law contexts, and it’s vital.  I’m in a jurisdiction, Texas, in
which I can look to some of the guidance provided by state law, but
there are factors often not fleshed out in the state decisions.
The Restatement does a marvelous job of providing some flesh.
It gives me the starting point to research not only how Texas has han-
dled this issue in a variety of fact contexts, which is critical, but also if
there are open areas that Texas hasn’t addressed, in which I’m not
bound by the precedent of either Texas or the Fifth Circuit if those
are the governing law sources.  If there’s some uncertainty about
which way to go, I also have the beginning points of where to look for
how other courts have addressed the issue.
Another great example is in privacy, which is a very different set
of circumstances.  Unlike the independent-contractor versus em-
ployee question, the privacy issues that are presented most often now
have been greatly affected by changes in technology.  The advent of
virtual workplaces and social media and other forms of communica-
tion requires reexamination of privacy concepts that were formulated
in different times and contexts.
So what does the Restatement do that’s particularly helpful to a
trial judge in an area in which, although there used to be a fair
amount of common law, that common law either doesn’t work well
anymore or it simply doesn’t apply?
Here again, it’s very helpful.  The privacy sections are not as
tethered to the existing law because there is not as much existing law
to tether to.  But the privacy sections are a great starting point because
they frame the way in which I ought to be thinking about what the
important questions are, and that’s enormously helpful.
And here I just want to give you a sense, very briefly, of how im-
portant the Employment Restatement will be to trial judges every-
where.  I sit in a big city.  Employment cases are roughly, at any given
time, probably thirty percent of my civil docket.  They cover a huge
span of issues.
In some of those cases, the Fifth Circuit will have clearly spoken,
and I don’t have the freedom that my two distinguished colleagues to
my left have of being able to say, “You know what? I don’t like that
rule. I don’t care if my court came up with it before.  I’m going to call
for an en banc,” which you have the ability to do, or, as Justice
Durham can say, “We’re not doing that anymore. . . .”
JUDGE BERZON: If you can get your colleagues to agree.
JUSTICE DURHAM: If you hang around for thirty years, often you
can.
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JUDGE ROSENTHAL: That’s true. I’m working on that.  I’m a one-
judge court, which gives me some autonomy.  But I am bound by lim-
its that appellate courts are not subject to; it’s a different enterprise.
So if the Fifth Circuit has spoken, I can engage in what I refer to as
judicial moaning, otherwise known as whining.  But that’s about it.  If
the Supreme Court of Texas has spoken, ditto, only they don’t grade
my papers.  I can whine a little bit more loudly.
But as is often the case, Texas law or the law of another state
applies because lots of employment contracts have choice-of-law
clauses.  Even in a nondiversity case there may be a contract that will
say I’ve got to look to Utah law, I’ve got to look to California law, or I
have to look to the law of New York.  And I have to figure out what
that law is.  Enter the Restatement!
Or if it is a case in which I don’t have an answer clearly provided
under the applicable governing law, enter the Restatement.  It is
amazing how many gaps remain open that specific cases require me to
dig into and figure out.
I am daily reminded about how little I know in an area that I deal
with every single day, over and over again.  It’s amazing.  Just as Judge
Berzon rightly says, the Restatement is most useful, perhaps, in areas
where we don’t have familiarity.  But what I daily understand is that
there are lots of those kinds of areas within subjects that I think I
know pretty well.
And that’s part of the joy of the work, but it is also a source of the
need by judges and law clerks, who are doing much of this initial in-
formation gathering for us, thank goodness.  One reason this Restate-
ment will be so useful is that employment law is a huge amount of our
dockets.  We’ve got to be as current as we can.  The Restatement is,
even with electronic research, the most efficient gatherer of the widest
range of background law and of sources that we will find useful to
consult.
JUSTICE DURHAM: My only complaint is that they won’t do up-
dated editions.
JUDGE BERZON: I was about to say that as a case-gathering process,
it just gets quickly out of date.  For example, the four recent FedEx
cases all came out after the May draft.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: That’s true, but it’s a starting point, and we
know what to do to figure out what’s happened to cases.
In addition to the black-letter formulation, the illustrations and
the comments are useful explications of concepts that might be both
unfamiliar and complicated to unpack, and that are not intuitive.
A related way in which the Restatement may be most useful over
and over is in writing summary-judgment opinions and jury instruc-
tions.  Employment cases generate motions for summary judgment
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more reliably than any other single kind of case that I have on my
docket.  And when we deny summary judgment and we have to go to
trial, we have to instruct the jury.
The Supreme Court has not yet adopted my idea that before they
announce a new rule in an employment case, they need to see it writ-
ten in the form of an instruction to the jury.
JUDGE BERZON: No, they have not.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: I worked recently to put the “but for” causa-
tion standard announced by Justice Alito for the Supreme Court in
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar 28 into a clear
jury instruction.  After years of law school, we all know what “but for”
means.  It’s harder for jurors, who don’t talk or think in those terms.
Not only do I instruct juries in cases that I try but I spent a good
part of last year on a committee rewriting jury instructions in employ-
ment law for the district judges in the circuit.  It was a heavy
responsibility.
It brought home how useful this Restatement is.  I would go to
the earlier drafts and look at the way in which the black-letter law
formulated the standards that I was trying to boil down and present in
a clear way.
I would go to the illustrations because they focused me on the
different facts that would make a difference with respect to different
formulations.  I would go to the collection of cases in the reporters’
notes to look at how other courts had instructed juries, to find re-
cently approved jury instructions.
I hope and predict that trial judges and their law clerks will find
this Restatement enormously useful to decide and to write opinions in
employment cases, and to instruct jurors when those cases are tried.
Lawyers ought to be citing it to us because the best thing lawyers can
do as an advocate for their client is to give the district judge what is
most helpful to the judge to rule in that client’s favor.
That’s my pitch.
JUDGE BERZON: One of my reactions to lawyers citing the Restate-
ment is that this is one area where it doesn’t much matter if they cite
it because it’s there and you know where to look.  It’s not that diffi-
cult.  But there is a gap the lawyers will find if they do go looking
through the Restatement now that it’s finished.  It relates to the par-
ticular example that Lee gave, which is how you prove motive.  The
problem is not covered in the Restatement, I believe.  Is that right?
PROFESSOR MICHAEL HARPER: Can I say something about that?  It
relates back to what you were talking about with the common law and
statutes.  Early on, we were uncertain how to deal with this area be-
28 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013) (mem.).
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cause of the overlays with statutes.  I think that we realize that we were
going to deal with questions that come up under the statutes, if they
also came up under the common-law cases.
JUDGE BERZON: What I’m saying is that this one does come up, in
the public-policy tort directly.
PROFESSOR HARPER: Yes, it does in terms of the different reasons
for acting and the consequences.  But in general we don’t address
how you prove motive.
JUSTICE DURHAM: I’m not sure whether the proof-offering phe-
nomenon would be well suited to being addressed in a Restatement.
It’s something we do deal with all the time.  We deal with it in the
criminal law and we deal with it across the civil-law process, in a range
of different kinds of claims.
PROFESSOR ESTREICHER: One problem is that much of the McDon-
nell Douglas [Corp. v. Green]29 verbal formulation is just gibberish.
JUDGE BERZON: I’m not talking about the mode of proof of causa-
tion but of the concept.  We were talking before about the retaliation
cases.  In the case I was describing, the statute actually says something
like a “contributing factor,” so the language is not “but for” cause.
PROFESSOR ESTREICHER: I actually think we should have done
more on causation.  It’s hard to do.  We have the Restatement (Third)
Torts projects and we didn’t want to step on their toes.
What I was saying is if you could suggest to the Council that if
there’s an opportunity in an upcoming project such as the Restate-
ment of Torts, that it actually deal with causation.  That would be very
helpful.  It’s enormously important.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: I think that’s a great suggestion.  There are
parts to this Restatement that are not included that perhaps could
have been.  It did need to get finished.  Eleven years is actually rela-
tively short for any Restatement and for this one in particular, when
you think about the scope of what it did address, which is pretty
breathtaking, and the complexity of what it did address.
We should also note the process involved in producing this work.
I wish all of the students here could see this process.
It’s a process of deliberation and exchange that is remarkable.  It
did not achieve a product that reflects agreement by everyone on
every point.  Far from it.
It instead produced something that everybody can look at and see
its sources, that is workable for people on both sides of the “v,” while
the developments in the law and the debates continue.  That in itself
is quite an achievement.
29 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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How do you do that?  You bring together advisors chosen because
they have views at all points along the spectrum.  They talk to each
other.  They react to the work without holding back, and that’s fine.
You add members who volunteer and provide similar feedback.
Those gathered talk about the revisions that their comments re-
sult in.  That process, that iteration, and reiteration, and revision, and
reaction, and re-revision take place over and over.  And the work goes
to the Council over and over.
The Council, which is not a subject-area specific group at all,
reads it in preparation for each meeting and comes prepared to go
over the text with the reporters.  “This section, this section, this sec-
tion, here are the comments.  Here are the suggestions, large and
small.”
That goes back to the reporters.  They revise again.
JUSTICE DURHAM: Your comments remind me that this project, as-
suming there are enough employment law wonks out there, could be
a new process for historians in the sense that there was so much schol-
arly engagement with the project throughout.
There were several symposium conferences and law review arti-
cles critiquing drafts.  You can go from what’s been published in that
connection, to what actually happened to the drafts in the revision
process, and see that evolution.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: I would add one point to the description of
the dynamic in the evolution of the text.  The ALI provides one of the
very few frameworks in which members of the academy, practicing
lawyers, and judges come together.
JUSTICE DURHAM: We all have a stake.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: We all have a stake, and we all participate.
There are too few opportunities for that to occur.  We don’t get the
benefit as judges from a lot of what you guys in the academy do.
JUSTICE DURHAM: Much as we love to read all of your articles.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: Right.
JUDGE BERZON: I was entirely new to this process, and I did find it
quite exhilarating.  I get so frustrated by the fact that when I encoun-
ter something new or interesting, that I can’t call up Larry Gold or
other people that I’ve worked with over the years, or people who are
experts in an area that I don’t know, and say, “Give me the lay of the
land.”
What I want is an off-the-wall check.  If I said this, would I be off-
the-wall?  Not would I be right or wrong, but would it be off-the-wall?
We don’t have that engagement on a daily basis in our decision mak-
ing.  Personally, I think it’s a loss.
When I was an appellate law clerk, when the ethical rules were a
lot less rigid, the judge I clerked for told me to get in touch with my
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labor law professor and give him our problem and ask him what he
thought about it.
I don’t get brainwashed easily.  If I ask people something, I’m not
going to believe what they say, but I’m going to be helped in
understanding the problem.  This process in which judges and lawyers
and academics were able to talk through issues without those con-
straints seems, to me, to be not only an enjoyable one but also a pro-
ductive one.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: And an important one.  That’s part of the
unique contribution of the Restatement in an area in which judges
need daily guidance to know that they are not going to be off-the-wall,
that they are not going to be doing harm, large or small, by the results
that they reach.  It is enormously reassuring for judges to know that
the results are going to be within where most courts that have looked
at similar issues have come out and safe, in that sense, but not frozen.
Every fact set is different.  Every case is different enough to make
the work both challenging and interesting.  We need all the help we
can get.  When it is good help, when there is no other help like it, it
really is a contribution.
The one question I do have for all of those in the academy,
professors in particular, is whether you would view this as a boon to
your teaching, whether in employment law or agency law.  How might
you work the Restatement into your own day jobs in trying to make a
subject area that has a whole lot of subtopics and a whole lot of com-
plication a little clearer for the students?
This is a booming area.  It’s a huge area for lawyers.  When other
areas of litigation have, because of influences ranging from tort re-
form to other things, declined a little bit, this area has exploded.  The
practitioners have good steady work here.
PROFESSOR SCHWAB: Just to comment on that.  I think every
casebook editor and professor of employment law teaching in this
area is going to have to figure out in the next year or two to what
extent and how to get the Restatement into their casebooks and
teaching.
It’s not dissimilar to what you’re saying.  As a casebook editor,
we’re not going to accept it wholesale and just sort of change our
casebook to this, but we’ll be selective.  The goal of the casebook is
quite different than the goal of a Restatement.
PROFESSOR STEVEN WILLBORN: This project has been going on a
long time.  It’s already in casebooks.
PROFESSOR SCHWAB: True.
PROFESSOR WILLBORN: I just wanted to say something in thinking
about this and thinking about Ted St. Antoine and about how incredi-
bly difficult it is to assess the success of this Restatement.  Ted St.
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Antoine spent probably ten years of his life doing a Model Employ-
ment Termination Act.  The project involved another entity very simi-
lar to the ALI, over 100 years old, which also brings judges and
academics together.  The metric there is much easier.  That model
statute got enacted nowhere.  In a way the audience is much less com-
plicated.  Here even the discussion among you three judges is
complicated.
Another thing is that it is one product.  The Restatement of Em-
ployment Law has fifteen or twenty products, and some of them, I
think, will definitely impact and others probably won’t, just by the law
of probabilities.
One other thing you made me think of, Judge Rosenthal, in jury
instructions, for example, you don’t see very much about instructions
in Ted’s project.  It’s right there or it’s not right there.  The metrics
for judging how successful a project like this is seem incredibly
complicated.
PROFESSOR HARPER: Karl Llewellyn’s UCC project for the Uniform
Commissioners was really successful.
PROFESSOR ESTREICHER: I wish we could all have the luck of Karl
Llewellyn here.  That’s why you have to cite the Restatement in your
decisions.  Once you cite it, the lawyers will cite it.  Even if you dump
on it, cite it.  Bring in some of our academic critics.  That’s fine.
For the students in the room, there are a lot of nuggets in here
for your journal notes that could have a good deal of influence in
some areas where the law is incomplete.  For example, bad-faith rea-
sons for enforcing a noncompete covenant.  That’s a really hard issue.
Can an employer fire a worker and still insist on enforcing a noncom-
pete?  We can really benefit from a fifty-state survey on whether an
employer can do that.
Employees as fiduciaries in a position of “trust and confidence”—
that is another area that needs work.  Reinstatement as a remedy in
common-law cases?  Charlie Sullivan is not here, but he says that you
can actually get reinstatement under the common law.  There are a lot
of great topics here, better than writing about “geshrei,” which is a
Latin/Gaelic word that means, “I hate that decision and I will tell you
how bad it is,” which is what many articles and notes end up doing.
That is despite the fact that the Supreme Court or an appellate court
is unlikely to change its ruling because of the article or note.  The best
kind of writing is about issues that have not been fully resolved yet.
PROFESSOR HILLMAN: I can’t let the discussion end without de-
fending Ted St. Antoine.  I think there are other ways to judge that
contribution.  I don’t know this for a fact, but it could be that many of
those ideas were incorporated into other works or even into cases or
new articles.  I would guess that there are great ideas in there.
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MR. LAURENCE GOLD: To say that that was ten years well spent or
wasted on the basis of how many state legislatures chose to adopt it
seems to be the absolutely wrong test.  That’s like saying all the people
who worked forever to have a federal civil rights act spent their time
on the wrong thing.
PROFESSOR WILLBORN: Let me try to make amends for that.  We
dedicate our casebook to Ted St. Antoine.  He’s a mentor to us.
My only point was that it’s much more complex to evaluate the
success of this Restatement.  Things are less visible here and the audi-
ences are more diverse.
PROFESSOR HILLMAN: Steve, I didn’t take your comments that way
at all.
JUSTICE DURHAM: We don’t usually look to state legislatures as
necessarily the best judges of the quality, sensibility, humanity, and
sanity of a piece of legislation.  That’s just not what happens in a state
legislature.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: Particularly during campaign season.
PROFESSOR ESTREICHER: That is an example about why we didn’t
touch the at-will rule because in most countries the at-will rule has
been changed by statute.  Those statutes have their own limited
remedies.
JUDGE ROSENTHAL: There’s lots of ways to measure the success of
a Restatement.  One way to measure failure is by its irrelevance.  A
quick way to become irrelevant is to take a position that ninety-eight
percent of the jurisdictions will reject.
PROFESSOR DEMOTT: I would also like to say that I think one of
the responsibilities that we have as senior academics at very stable in-
stitutions is sometimes to be willing to take a longer view.  There’s
almost a panic sometimes for mechanical measurement of success in
one way or another.  This can create perverse consequences for how
people choose to use their time, which is the gift that we’ve been
given by indefinite tenure.
PROFESSOR WILLBORN: And good health.
PROFESSOR DEMOTT: And good health.  I’m always disturbed
when people start with citations.  I believe the ALI used to publish
annual citations to each particular Restatement.  Torts always win.
Agency always ends up third.  And poor old suretyship!
I think that’s so deeply misguided as to all the kinds of reasons it
can be important for academics to do serious scholarship.  It is a neat
idea that you never fully know what influence you might have.  It may
be sometimes easy to lose sight of that fact.
PROFESSOR SCHWAB: I really thank everybody for the participation.
It’s been a great day.  I like the way we ended it.  How are we going to
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assess this Restatement?  There’s no metric, but this discussion, I be-
lieve, has been extremely useful.
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